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Abstract
Natural experiments provide explicit and robust identifying assumptions for the
estimation of treatment e¤ects. Yet their use for policy design is often limited by the
di¢ culty in extrapolating on the basis of reduced-form estimates of policy e¤ects.
On the contrary, structural models allow us to conduct ex ante policy analysis but
their internal validity is often questioned. In this paper, we suggest combining the
two approaches by putting structure on a regression discontinuity (RD) design. We
start with a RD estimation, exploiting the fact that childless single individuals under
25 years of age are not eligible for social assistance in France. A behavioral model
is then identied using the same age discontinuity. While this model replicates well
the employment e¤ect obtained by RD, it can also be used to predict actual policy
reforms and, hence, to check external validity. Showing good performances in this
regard, it is nally used to simulate important counterfactual policies, namely the
extension of social assistance to young people and the employment e¤ects of a large
in-work benet reform.
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1 Introduction
Recent debates in the economic literature tend to compare and contrast the di¤erent ap-
proaches existing for policy evaluation (Angrist and Pischke, 2010, Deaton, 2009, Heckman
and Urzua, 2010). A reasonable approach, however, seems to try to combine them opti-
mally (Blundell, 2012). In particular, the economic literature should attempt to reconcile
the methods based on randomized or natural experiments (ex post policy evaluation) with
those relying on structural, behavioral models (ex ante evaluation). As stated by Imbens
(2010), "much of the debate ultimately centers on the weight researchers put on internal
validity versus external validity". For causal inference of actual policy e¤ects, it is hard to
dispute that the experimental and quasi-experimental approaches are preferable. Critics
of the structural approach generally argue that it is di¢ cult to identify all the primitive
parameters in an empirically compelling manner because of selection e¤ects, simultaneity
bias and omitted variables. In fact, most studies using structural models are identied
on the basis of strong or unclear assumptions. As a result, their internal validity is often
questioned. By contrast, ex post evaluation methods provide credible identifying assump-
tions. Yet, their external validity is often limited, given the reduced-form nature of the
estimated statistics and the fact that these statistics are not policy invariant parameters
of economic models. This explains why structural models are still broadly used, allowing
analysts to perform ex ante simulations for policy design as well as welfare analyses.
In this study, we combine the two approaches, focusing on the labor supply e¤ect of tax-
benet policies. We rst rely on an age condition leading to a discontinuity in eligibility
for the main social assistance program in France. We focus on the welfare program in
place before 2009, a transfer to the workless poor (the Revenue Minimum dInsertion,
RMI). We exploit the fact that childless single individuals under 25 years of age are not
eligible for this transfer. Estimates of the negative employment e¤ect of social assistance
are identied at the threshold using a RD design. We argue that the RD estimate is not a
su¢ cient statistic to perform out-of-sample predictions. Counterfactual simulations and
extrapolations further away from the discontinuity require the addition of structure to
the model. A labor supply model simply makes the underlying interpretation of the RD
design explicit, i.e. optimizing agents in a static framework make participation decisions
based on nancial incentives to work. Exogenous variation of these nancial gains at
the age discontinuity identies the model. Variation in expected wage rates at di¤erent
ages creates further changes in gains to work which explains how di¤erent age groups
may react di¤erently to policy reforms. The only parametric restriction required for
making predictions at ages further away from the threshold is that age a¤ects behavioral
parameters continuously.
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This framework illustrates the valuable combination of ex post and ex ante methods.
The discontinuity guarantees credible identication of the structural model while the
behavioral model allows us to answer some of the questions at the core of the political
debate: Does an extension of welfare programs to under-25 year-olds generate greater
unemployment and, possibly, long-term poverty among the youngest workers? What is
the e¤ect of an in-work transfer reform that extends RMI payments to the working poor
(the Revenue de Solidarité Active, RSA, introduced in 2009)? The rst question is of
particular importance in the present context of very high youth unemployment. The
16   24 year olds have been hit particularly hard by the crisis and face the highest rate
of unemployment in France. The youth also have limited access to welfare programs,
which results in a poverty rate twice as large as that of the 25-30 years-old.1 Studying age
conditions for social benets is not only relevant for France, as such discontinuities exist
in several EU countries (e.g. Spain, Luxembourg, Denmark) and in Canada (see Lemieux
and Milligan, 2008). The second question relates to recent debates on the optimal design
of tax-benet systems (see Immervoll et al., 2007) and on the e¢ ciency of in-work transfers
such as those in place in the US and the UK (i.e., the Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC,
and the Working Family Tax Credit, WFTC). We simulate several counterfactual policies
to answer these questions, notably the extension of social assistance to the under-25 year-
olds and the introduction of the 2009 RSA reform. We nd that the 2009 system restores
work incentives among the over-25 year olds, which is conrmed by an ex post analysis of
what actually happened after 2009. In this way, we provide an original check of the model
external validity. We also nd that extending the new welfare program to those under
25 years of age should not reduce participation signicantly. Hence, it seems possible
to reduce poverty in this group without further weakening their attachment to the labor
market.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the contribution of the paper while
reviewing the existing literature. Section 3 presents the institutional background and the
data while section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 reports and analyzes the
results while section 6 concludes.
1With a youth unemployment rate of 24.7% in 2012, France is above the EU-15 and EU-28 averages
(22.3% and 23%). Unemployment of the under-25 year olds has increased steadily in recent years in
France, from 22.9% in 2011 to 25.5% in 2013. Youth unemployment and youth poverty are also suspected
to have additional external e¤ects like increasing crime (Fougère et al., 2009).
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2 Literature and Contribution
2.1 Structural Labor Supply Models
A very large number of policy studies have relied on structural models estimated on cross-
sectional or panel data to analyze existing scal and social policies, to compare them to
optimal designs or to help policy making of future redistributive systems (see for instance
the discussion in Blundell andMaCurdy, 1999). As argued in the introduction, the internal
validity of these models is not guaranteed. Maybe the main identication issue concerns
the fact that omitted variables (e.g., being a "hard working" person) could positively
a¤ect gross wage rates and consumption-leisure preferences simultaneously. If variation
in gross wages in the population is endogenous to preferences, it cannot be directly used to
infer potential responses to nancial incentives (for instance a tax reform). In traditional
labor supply models, identication is provided by exclusion restrictions and hinges on the
validity of instruments (e.g., Hausman, 1981, for the US or Bourguignon and Magnac,
2001, for France).
More recently, the use of discrete choice models has allowed the incorporation of the
complete e¤ect of tax-benet policies on household budget constraints. In this way, iden-
tication can be obtained from exogenous variation in tax-benet rules across regions
(e.g., across US states in Hoynes, 1996) or over time (e.g., Blundell et al., 1998). Time or
spatial variation in tax-benet rules brings the identication of structural models closer
to the quasi-experimental approach. Most often, however, only cross-sectional variation
is available. In this case, discrete choice models are identied by all the nonlinearities
and discontinuities introduced to budget curves by tax-benet rules, combined with de-
mographic variation (e.g. Laroque and Salanié, 2002, for France, van Soest, 1995, for the
Netherlands). For instance, two identical persons (same gross wage, age, gender, etc.) will
face di¤erent e¤ective tax schedules if one has two children and the other has three, sim-
ply because child benets, child tax allowances or other child-related policies vary with
gross income. This type of identication is parametric since demographics themselves
a¤ect labor supply. More fundamentally, it must also rely on some implicit exclusion
restrictions (in our example above, we may assume that the number of children a¤ects
preferences linearly while the specic switch from two to three children only impacts the
budget constraint through discontinuous child-related policies).
In this study, the age discontinuity plays a similar role. However, while labor supply
models estimated on the full population muddle multiple sources of identication, that
are usually not made explicit, we focus on a very homogeneous group, i.e. childless singles
aged around 25. In this way, we reduce demographic variation to only one dimension (age),
which provides us with a clean setting for identication. First, the exclusion restriction
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is more reasonable in this case. Contrary to the example with children above, there is no
obvious reason for preferences to vary discontinuously with age. Second, age is a dimension
over which individuals have no control, in contrast to fertility or marital status. Finally,
focusing on only one source of heterogeneity makes the underlying identifying assumption
explicit.2 As shall be seen, the RD design only requires that people just under 25 are
identical to people just above 25, other things being equal. The structural model requires
a little more.
2.2 (Quasi-)Experiments
There is a strong history of using natural experiments  notably US/UK tax-benet
reforms to quantify labor supply responses. For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996) use
a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach to identify the impact of the EITC on the labor supply
of US single mothers. They nd compelling evidence that single mothers joined the labor
market in response to this incentive. In the UK, Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007)
use changes in the generosity of the WFTC for the same purpose. Using a RD design,
Lemieux and Milligan (2008) exploit the fact that, prior to 1989 in Quebec, unattached
persons younger than 30 years old received substantially less in welfare payments than
similar individuals aged 30 years old or older. They nd that more generous transfers
reduce employment.
We exploit a similar discontinuity here, drawing on the RD design detailed in Bargain and
Doorley (2011) for the year 1999. It pertains to the fact that childless single individuals
under 25 years of age were not eligible for the main social assistance program in France
(RMI).3 Interestingly, this policy feature concerns a group which is rarely studied in
the literature. Childless singles are seldom concerned by welfare reforms in the US or
the UK (changes in the EITC or the WFTC most often concerned couples or single
individuals with children). It is an important group, however, given the increase in its
relative population share. Young single individuals also form a group particularly at risk
of poverty. Youth unemployment is a recurrent problem in many OECD countries and in
France in particular. It is therefore crucial to evaluate the potential increase in inactivity
2For all these reasons, we refrain from estimating a standard labor supply model on a broader pop-
ulation. This would defeat the purpose of our "clean" exercise. In particular, we would not know what
role is played by the age discontinuity among the multiple sources of identication provided by policy
nonlinearities and discontinuities.
3In the same line of research, Chemin and Wasmer (2012) use the French labor force survey (LFS) and
a triple-di¤erence approach to exploit the fact that the Alsace region in France already had a system of
social assistance before the RMI was introduced all over the country. Their estimates of the disincentive
e¤ect corroborate those in Bargain and Doorley (2011).
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that may follow an extension of social transfers to the under 25s, as motivated in the
introduction.
2.3 Comparing and Combining Approaches
Comparing methods is a rst important step. Lalondes (1986) landmark paper studied
the ability of a number of econometric methods, including Heckmans selection model, to
replicate the results from an experimental evaluation of a labor market program, on the
basis of non-experimental data. In the same vein, comparisons of randomized or natural
experiments with the predictions of structural models would be useful. Yet there is no
systematic attempt to do so in the labor supply literature. A few studies have recently
compared the employment e¤ect of tax-benet policies predicted using structural models
with the actual e¤ect as measured by ex post evaluation techniques, including di¤erence-
in-di¤erence (e.g., Blundell, 2006, Cai et al., 2007, Thoresen et al., 2012), regression
discontinuity (Hansen and Liu, 2011) or randomised experiments (Todd and Wolpin,
2006). While most of these studies point to the satisfying performance of structural
models, others do not (especially Choi, 2011 and Keane and Wolpin, 2007). Most of these
studies tend to put structural model predictions beside an ex post evaluation of the same
policy e¤ect, and conclude from the comparison on the quality or aws of the structural
approach. This is an important and useful exercise. Yet such comparaisons run the risk
of treating one or other of the approaches in a biased way.
More fundamentally, ex post and ex ante evaluation approaches are complementary, as
discussed in the introduction. Treatment e¤ect estimates inferred from natural exper-
iments are often reliable as they derive from clear and robust identication strategies.
However, while they can inform about the labor supply e¤ect of the policy regime under
study, they are of limited use for predicting future or alternative policy scenarios. Indeed,
their reduced-form nature makes that these estimates are often endogenous to the policy
environment and cannot be used to simulate policy reforms. Even when they escape from
this type of Lucas critique, these estimates are usually far from being a su¢ cient statistic
that can predict all types of counterfactual reforms, as explained in section 4. Thus we
suggest "adding some structure", i.e., designing a structural model that is identied using
the same natural experiment (a policy discontinuity in our approach).4 It is then used
4A few studies have explored the benets of randomization or quasi-experiments for identication,
estimation and assessment of structural models. Imbens (2010) cites an early example, Hausman andWise
(1979), who estimate a model for attrition with data from a randomized income maintenance experiment.
Recent examples include Card and Hyslop (2005), who estimate a structural model of welfare participation
using experimental data from Canada; Todd and Wolpin (2003), who analyze data from Mexicos Progresa
program; Attanasio et al. (2011) who also analyze the e¤ect of Progresa on education choices; Imbens,
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to simulate an actual policy reform that extends redistribution towards the working poor
in France, the RSA. Comparing the predicted employment e¤et of this reform against
the actual e¤ect allows us checking the external validity of the model. This is important
because many studies in the literature t the data with a structural model and then claim
that this can be used for other policy simulation. In what follows, we do not only make
this claim but show that the model does successfully reproduce the e¤ects of the RSA
reform.
In the absence of purely experimental data, the question of which type of natural ex-
periment is suitable for our purpose arises. We suggest using RD as one of the simplest
and cleanest forms of natural experiments. Using RD designs is, unsurprisingly, popular
in the labor supply literature as this strategy provides assignment to treatment that is
as good as randomin the neighborhood of the discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Additionally, studying specic policy discontinuities, such as an age discontinuity in social
assistance rules, provides a more clear-cut assessment than natural experiments based on
policy changes over time, which must control for simultaneous changes in the economic
environment.5 These considerations are guiding our approach. Yet we must acknowledge
that, even though RD designs may have the highest degree of internal validity among
quasi-experiments, they also show strong limitations regarding the possibility to extrapo-
late to other subpopulations than those used for causal inference.6 The behavioral model
allows extrapolations, notably those further away from the cuto¤, but at the price of
an additional identifying assumption (i.e. the global continuity of behavioral parameters
with the forcing variable, as explained in section 4.2).
Rubin and Sacerdote (2001) who estimate labor supply models, exploiting random variation in unearned
income using data from lottery winners and Duo, Hanna, and Ryan (2007) who look at the e¤ect of
monitoring and nancial incentives on teachers absences. There is certainly more room for such work
where (quasi) experimental variation is used to improve the identication of structural models.
5Lemieux and Milligan (2008) actually nd that commonly used di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators
may perform poorly with inappropriately chosen control groups, notably, groups not placed in the same
labor market as the treated. RD analyses provide an advantageous alternative when available, although
they must verify if other policies could generate similar discontinuities (which we check in section 3.1).
Here, a related di¢ culty with double di¤erences is the question of how the control group should be
incorporated in the structural model estimation, since this group would also require exogenous variation
for identication of its behavioral parameters.
6One recent attempt to do so identies causal e¤ects away from the RD discontinuity by conditioning
on covariates besides the running variable, in an e¤ort to eliminate the relationship between the running
and outcome variable (Angrist and Rokkanen, 2013) The authors, however, admit that it is not always
possible to nd such controls.
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3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Institutional Background
RMI and RSA. The policy we study, the RMI, acted until 2009 as a last resortbenet
for those who are ineligible for (or have exhausted their right to) other benets in France.
We describe here the situation relevant for the year studied, 1999, but the situation for the
workless poor is almost unchanged by the 2009 RSA reform that we describe and simulate
below (the RSA simply adds an in-work transfers to the working poor). The RMI can be
claimed by any French resident, aged at least 25 (or aged under 25 with a dependent child)
and not in education. The RMI is often complemented by means-tested housing subsidies
which, together with the RMI, almost lift a workless poor person to the poverty line at
40% of median equivalized income. In practice, entitlement to the RMI does not include
any obligation to actively seek work or to train, and it is time unlimited. Denote R the
maximum amount of RMI that a single individual can obtain and S(E) the amount of
housing subsidy she can obtain as a function of her earnings E. As a simplication, we can
dene this persons disposable income as C(E;A) = S(E) +max(0; R   t:E):1(A  25)
with A denoting age in years and t the taper rate of RMI. Specically around the age
cut-o¤ and for someone out of work, we have C(0; 24) = S(0) and C(0; 25) = S(0) + R.
With 1999 gures, C(0; 25) is around EUR 540 per month and 162% more than C(0; 24).
After a short period, during which it is possible to cumulate earnings and some RMI,
the withdrawal rate t becomes 100%. This conscatory implicit taxation on earnings is
expected to discourage participation, especially among those with weak attachment to
the labor market and low wage prospects (see Gurgand and Margolis, 2008, Bargain and
Doorley, 2011, Wasmer and Chemin, 2012). The system prevailing after 2009, the RSA,
introduces an in-work transfer by permanently reducing the taper rate t from 100% to
38%. The age condition is maintained.
Graphical Illustration. Figure 1 aims to clarify the impact of these redistributive
schemes on living standards and to compare them together and with an international
reference point. Precisely, we rst compare the RMI schedule (2009 parameters), the
RSA schedule (parameters after reform in 2009) and the schedule of the British Working
Tax Credit (WTC), for a single childless individual paid at the French hourly minimum
wage and assumed eligible to these transfers (i.e. above 24 years old). The WTC is
used for comparison since it also targets childless single individuals in the UK (contrary
to the US EITC or the pre-2003 British WFTC, which are both targeted at couples or
individuals with children only). Figure 1 also reports budget constraints under the three
redistributive regimes (these counterfactual simulations are obtained using the tax-benet
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Figure 1: Schedules of Alternative Redistributive Schemes and Budget Constraints
RMI, RSA and WTC Schedules
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microsimulation EUROMOD, which reproduces the tax-benet rules for several European
countries including France and the UK).
The rst graph of Figure 1 shows that the RSA schedule is particularly generous for
a minimum wage worker at full-time (gross earnings of around EUR 1,400 per month).
The WTC for single individuals without children is paid to those working at least 30
hours per week, which explains why it begins at just below 1,000 EUR per month in
our example. Although its taper rate (37%) is comparable to that of the RSA (38%), a
housing allowance is deductible from the RSA amount before the taper rate is applied,
leading to an e¤ective withdrawal rate lower than that of the WTC in our example.
The second graph of Figure 1 shows that compared to the RMI regime, the RSA reform
clearly increases the disposable income di¤erential between a full-time work and being
out-of-work. Interestingly, in the range of EUR 1000-1500 of gross earnings where many
low-paid individuals are to be found, both the French RSA and the British WTC regimes
provide a similar level of net resources (despite di¤erent levels of transfers as seen in the
rst graph and because of generous tax free allowances in the UK, which allow very low
income people pay no tax).
Confounding Institutional Factors at Age 25. A last important aspect of the in-
stitutional background is the possible confounding factors regarding the age discontinuity.
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Along all institutional features that could also be responsible for a discontinuity in em-
ployment patterns at age 25, we rst investigated other tax-benet policies. The only
relevant benet policy in terms of age condition appeared to be the RMI itself, i.e., par-
ents receiving the RMI obtain an increment for children aged 21-24. Yet, this applies only
if the child is a student, and hence does not concern our target group of HS dropouts.
On the tax side, tax deductions are linked to the legal obligation of parents to nancially
support their children, which stops at the childs 25th birthday. Hence children may ex-
pect a double income e¤ect when they turn 25 (transfers received from their parents may
simply decrease as this obligation stops, and this e¤ect is accentuated by the fact that
parents become poorer as they do no longer benet from tax deductions). If leisure is
a normal good, tax policy cannot explain a drop in employment at age 25. Finally, we
have checked all the labor market policies targeted at young workers that may a¤ect their
labor supply (by decreasing job search costs) or the labor demand if youth employment
is subsidized by the state. For year 1999, relevant schemes (i.e. with an age condition)
included subsidized training programs in the private sector (with part-time work paid
below the minimum wage) and subsidized public-sector jobs for the youth. Importantly,
both schemes concerned youths under 26 or even under 30 in some cases. Hence, we
conrm that there is no other factor at work at the 25 year-old threshold, except the RMI
(see Bargain and Doorley, 2011, for more detail).
3.2 Data and Sample Selection
Datasets. RD estimations must rely on very large samples. With standard survey data,
age cells would become too small for meaningful analysis. For this reason, we pursue both
the RD analysis and the structural model estimation using the French Census Data for
the year 1999. Its coverage is universal and samples of 1=4 of the population are publicly
available from INSEE, corresponding to around 14:5 million people. Previous Census,
1982 and 1990, cannot be used since they correspond to years before the introduction
of the RMI (1989) or just after (a period with still few recipients). Our data for 1999
corresponds to a peak year, with around one million RMI recipients, following a gradual
expansion of the scheme over the 1990s (see Bargain and Doorley, 2011). As explained
below, external validity is checked using more recent Census data for years 2004-11.7
The Census provides data on age (in days), employment, type of contract, work duration,
marital status and household type. Data on income and receipt of RMI or other benets
7Census data collection became annual starting in 2004 and now covers the whole population over
a ve-year period. Because of limited data access, we could not carry out our main analysis on waves
2004-08 (before the RSA reform). We could only avail of employment rates by age for 2004-2011 Census
data, which we have used to conduct RD analyses for external validity checks (see section 5.2).
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is, unfortunately, not available. Wage estimations are, therefore, conducted using the
Enquête Emploi, i.e. the French Labor Force Survey (FLFS hereafter). This is a panel
survey conducted on an annual basis for the period 1990-2002. For cross-sectional use, the
annual FLFS is a representative sample of the French population, with a sampling rate of
1=300, providing information on employment, labor income (base salary plus all bonuses
and extra time payment and in-kind advantages), education and demographics. Hence,
it is possible to calculate hourly wages and estimate wage equations on key variables like
age and detailed education categories, as explained below (see also Chemin and Wasmer,
2012).
Sample Selection. The sample selection is applied to both Census and FLFS data. We
retain individuals aged 20-30 who are potential workers, i.e., not in education, in the army
or living on a (disability) pension. Our analysis focuses on singles without children who
live alone. First, childless single individuals represent the main group of RMI claimants.
Contrary to couples, whose joint labor supply decision is a relatively complicated problem,
they also allow for a clear interpretation of the potential labor supply e¤ects. Discarding
individuals with children is due to the fact that a parent is eligible for the RMI regardless
of age. Finally, and di¤erently from Bargain and Doorley (2011), we consider both female
and male singles, as well as all education categories. We also present results for a specic
group, the high school (HS) dropouts, who have the lowest nancial gains to work in the
short term and, possibly, weaker attachment to the labor market. They represent 22% of
the population of young singles aged 25  30 but are over-represented among single RMI
recipients in this age range, accounting for 52% of this group.
Descriptive Statistics. FLFS and Census data are used to estimate and predict wage
rates respectively. Wage estimations and the robustness of wage predictions are exten-
sively discussed in Appendix A.1. Both Census and FLFS data have comparable def-
initions of the key variables used to estimate wage rates and, in particular, education
categories.8 Table A.2 in Appendix A.2 provides descriptive statistics of both datasets
(for FLFS, we consider the year 1999 or, alternatively, a pool of years 1997-2001). We
show there that the two selected samples are comparable in terms of demographic and
education structures, which gives us condence in the wage imputation. Table A.2 also
shows that average simulated disposable incomes line up quite closely in the two datasets.
8Both datasets provide detailed information on qualications: junior school diploma (Diplôme Na-
tional du Brevet, BEPC, or lower secondary level diploma), junior vocational qualication certicates
(Certicat dAptitude Professionnelle, CAP, and Brevet dEtudes Professionnelles, BEP), high school
diploma (Baccalauréat, or upper secondary level diploma), rst college degree or advanced vocational
degree, higher degrees from universities or business/engineer "Grandes Ecoles".
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Additional material available from the authors compares the employment-age patterns
within the two data sources, using the ILO denition in both cases, for people aged 20-
30 (see also Bargain and Vicard, 2014). The FLFS shows larger employment rates (as
reected in the average employment gures in Table A.2), a discrepancy that becomes
smaller for older age groups. Given the smaller sample size of the FLFS, employment
levels by age also show a slightly more erratic pattern in these surveys. The overall trends
are, however, very similar.
4 Empirical Approach
Before turning to the structural model, we discuss how the age discontinuity in the RMI
program can be exploited to measure the disincentive e¤ect of this welfare scheme on
labor market participation.
4.1 RD Design
We start from Rubins framework, denoting Y i the propensity to be in work and Ti the
treatment variable for each unit i. Here, being treated refers to the possibility of availing
of the welfare program. As in Lemieux and Milligan (2008), this is simply determined by
the age eligibility condition for the program, that is, Ti = I(Ai  A) with Ai the forcing
variable (age) and A the age limit. Age is available in days so that we know exactly what
age people are at Census day and their employment status at that date. Consequently, and
because the treatment variable is a deterministic function of age, we are in the presence
of a sharpRD design. We denote Y i1 the potential outcome (participation decision)
if exposed to treatment, i.e. if in the eligible age range, and Y i0 the potential outcome
otherwise. Considering age in days as a continuous variable, we can make the usual
assumption:
Condition 1 (local continuity) The mean values of Y 1 and Y

0 , conditional on A, are
continuous functions of A at A:
Condition 1 leads to a measure of the average treatment e¤ect of the program at A as
captured by any discontinuity of the outcome at this threshold:
ATE(A) = lim
A!A+
E(Y 1 =A = A)  lim
A!A 
E(Y 0 =A = A):
It is more appropriate to express age in years, quarters or months:With age expressed in
days, age cells would be small and would display a very erratic age-employment pattern.
A discrete forcing variable means that we cannot compare observations "close enough" on
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both sides of the cuto¤ point to be able to identify the e¤ect. As explained in Lemieux
and Milligan (2008), parametric assumptions are required in this case. Hence, we specify
the RD model as:




i (Ai) + iI(Ai  A) + "i: (1)
With employment Yi = 1 for those with Y i > 0 and 0 otherwise, this model is easily
estimated by logit or probit techniques. The e¤ect of age Ai on the outcome variable is
captured by function (Ai) and by Ti = I(Ai  A). The parametric version of Condition
1 requires that (Ai) be a smooth function of age close to A. Under this condition, the
treatment e¤ect  is obtained by estimating the discontinuity in the empirical model at
the point where the forcing variable switches from 0 to 1. Given the discrete nature of
the forcing variable, we use alternative parametric forms for (A) in order to balance
the usual trade-o¤ between precision and bias (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Note that
coe¢ cients i and i bear a subscript i as they vary linearly with a set Zi of individual
characteristics. In particular, we shall introduce heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect with
i = 
0 + 1Zi. As explained, there is little demographic variation left except gender.
The other variation concerns education: we are especially interested in estimating specic
participation e¤ects of the RMI for HS dropouts, so that all coe¢ cients will vary with a
dummy equal to 1 for individuals in this group.
At this stage, it becomes clear that the RD design allows only limited extrapolation.
Given the employment e¤ect of the switch in maximum benet level R due to the age
condition (see amounts in section 3.1), it is possible to calculate the employment elasticity
with respect to R. Denoting Y the mean employment rate, this elasticity is written dY =Y
dR=R
and estimated around  :05 (similar elasticities are found in Bargain and Doorley, 2011,
and Lemieux and Milligan, 2008). It can be used to predict the employment e¤ect of
uprating policies, for instance when social assistance is uprated more rapidly than price
ination. Yet it is di¢ cult to say much more. For instance, we cannot extrapolate further
away from the discontinuity to answer our initial question regarding the employment e¤ect
of extending social assistance to those under 25. Also, we cannot predict the e¤ect of a
change in another social assistance parameter, the withdrawal rate t. Hence, we cannot
predict the e¤ect of a reform that increases work incentives by reducing this implicit
taxation rate. These two examples, among many, are motivated by the policy questions
asked in the introduction. They also point to the fact that the RD estimate is not a
su¢ cient statistic for predicting all types of policy reform. At a minimal cost, putting
structure on the RD design shall allow us to do so.
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4.2 Adding Structure
General Model. The interpretation of a potential disincentive e¤ect of social assistance
in the above RD design coincides with the rationality assumed in static labor supply
models (for instance, van Soest, 1995). In their discrete version, these models are based
on the assumption of agents choosing the weekly worked hours option j = 1; :::; J in
a discrete set of J common work durations (for instance non-participation, part-time,
full-time and overtime). In this setting, we can write utility at choice j as:
Uij = Ui(Hj; C(wiHj;Ai)  Fi:1(Hj > 0)) + ij (2)
with disposable income C(wiHj;Ai) (equivalent to consumption in this static framework)
and worked hours Hj. Disposable income is reduced by a level Fi for positive hours
choices. This term may capture xed costs of working as well as the cost of job search on
the labor market, so that it must vary with individual characteristics including age. The
deterministic utility levels are completed by i.i.d. error terms ij, assumed to follow an
extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution and to represent possible observational errors,
optimization errors or transitory situations.
Because function C(;Ai) accounts for the full tax-benet rules, this structural model
is widely used for policy analysis (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, for a survey). As
previously discussed, identication often relies on the nonlinearities/discontinuities or
time/spatial variation in the tax-benet rules. In our setting, we use the age condition
in social assistance eligibility, creating exogenous variation in nancial incentives at age
cuto¤, as the key source of identication. Since this discontinuity a¤ects only the nancial
di¤erence between working and not working, we shall focus on the participation margin.
As discussed in the concluding section, the more general model presented in equation
(2) could be identied using our approach but would require more variation (for instance
other discontinuities a¤ecting nancial gains between full and part time work).
Specications and Exclusion Restriction. We complete the specication in the
general case. Translog or quadratic utility functions in hours Hj and consumption C
are typically used for function Ui (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Bargain (2006)
and van Soest et al. (2002) show, however, that it is not possible to identify preferences
from other structural components like xed (or variable) costs of work, unless strong
parametric assumptions are made. Instead, we opt for a exible specication where
preference parameters vary with the choice j:
Uij = aij + bijC(wiHj;Ai) + cijC(wiHj;Ai)
2 + ij: (3)
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In this way, the "disutility" of work or other components like work costs are specied
through choice-specic terms aij and, hence, are not forced to vary linearly or quadrati-
cally with Hj as in standard functional forms. The same is true for interaction between
hours and consumption, with coe¢ cients bij and cij. Bargain (2006) shows that this spec-
ication nests the standard quadratic utility function used in many applications and ts
the data better (we check hereafter that it does not overt it). In addition, coe¢ cients in
(3) vary linearly with several taste-shifters Zi and, possibly, random terms for unobserved
heterogeneity. Taste shifters include gender and education (a "HS dropout" dummy) as in
model (2). Preference parameters can also vary with age and, in particular, the rst term




We must impose the following continuity condition:
Condition 2 (global continuity) Behavioral parameters aij; bij; cij vary continously with
age.
Three remarks are in order. First, while the parametric version of Condition 1 required
(Ai) to be a smooth function of age around the discontinuity, we specify behavioral pa-
rameters in (3) as globally continuous in age in order to use the model for extrapolation
further away from the threshold. Second, this exclusion restriction is standard in the lit-
erature and there is no harm in assuming away the possibility of discontinuous preferences
with respect to age (see our discussion at the end of section 2.1). Third, in the budget
constraint, wages wi are also a smooth function of age, so that the only source of age
discontinuity in the model is the exogenous change in nancial incentives.
Participation Model. With this setting, we now focus on the participation margin.
The choice of working full-time (j = 1) rather than staying out of the labor market
(j = 0) depends only on the di¤erence Y i = Ui1   Ui0. Then coe¢ cients on consumption
are identied but only the di¤erence ai = ai1   ai0 is identied for the constant. The
quadratic term in consumption in equation (3) is not necessary as we model participation
only. The propensity to be employed is written as:
Y i = ai + b1iC(wiH1;Ai)  b0iC(0;Ai) + i (4)
9This term entering utility in an (additive) separable way may capture work preferences, xed costs of
work and search costs, all possibly varying with age. The latter interpretation, seach costs, rationalizes
demand-side constraints in such a pure supply-side setting (cf. van Soest et al., 2002). Coe¢ cients a0ij
and a1ij both have subscript i as they vary with Zi, as do coe¢ cients in model (2). In particular, they
vary with a "HS dropout" dummy. Indeed, uneducated workers do not only have lower wage prospects
but also a weaker attachment to the labor market and, hence, larger search costs (see Be¤y et al., 2006,
and Gurgand and Margolis, 2008).
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is specied with the same smooth function of age. The rest captures the discontinuity
e¤ect (age condition) not through a single coe¢ cient  but with a bit more structure,
i.e. through nancial gains to work expressed as the distance between disposable income
when employed, C(wiH1;Ai), and disposable income when out of work, C(0;Ai).10
Note that while b1i may vary with age in a continuous way, b0i cannot vary with age as
it is identical for all individuals on the same side of the age threshold. We specify three
models. In the rst, b1i does not vary with age (model A). In the second, it varies linearly
(model B) while, in the third, it varies quadratically with age (model C). All coe¢ cients
a0i ; a
1
i ; b0i; b1i also vary with Zi (gender and a "HS dropout" dummy). Additionally we
make b1i vary linearly with ui, a random and normally distributed term accounting for
unobserved preferences for work (with zero mean and variance 2u).
The model is estimated as follows. First, wages are imputed for all observations in the
Census. This is done by estimating wage equations on FLFS data and predicting wages
in the Census (see Appendix A.1). Second, disposable income is calculated for each
observation and at each discrete labor supply choice (see Appendix A.2). That is, we use
detailed numerical simulation of tax-benet rules to obtain disposable income when out-of-
work, C(0;Ai), and when working full-time, C(wiH1;Ai) (we set H1 to 39 hours per week,
the institutionally set full time option in France in 1999). Third, the labor supply model
of equation (4) is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (see detailed estimates in
Appendix A.3). Under the assumption that error terms, ij; follow an EV-I distribution,
the (conditional) probability for each individual of choosing a given alternative has an
explicit analytical solution, i.e., a logistic function of deterministic utilities at all choices.
This multinomial logit model boils down to a simple logit in our case. Because the model
is nonlinear, the wage prediction errors (denoted i) are taken explicitly into account for
a consistent estimation. The unconditional probability is obtained by integrating out the
disturbance terms (ui and i) in the likelihood. In practice, this is done by averaging the
conditional probability over a number of draws for these terms, recalculating disposable
income each time.11 Finally, the model can be used to simulate counterfactual policy
10In practice, in (4), we do not impose these two income levels to have the same marginal e¤ect (i.e.
b1i 6= b0i). Indeed, individuals may value marginal out-of-work income di¤erently from marginal in-work
earnings (b0i may capture, for instance, the stigma e¤ect when living on welfare).
11A computationally convenient approach consists of using sequences of Halton draws, as suggested by
Train (2003). This allows us to reduce the number of draws to a tractable level (r = 10).
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scenarios, i.e. alternative functions C(;A) and hence new levels of disposable income,
used to predict the new optimal choice of each individual. Hypothetical, counterfactual
scenarios include abolishing the RMI (which we denote by function C0(;A) in Appendix
C), the replacement of the RMI by the 2009 RSA system and the removal of the age
condition.
5 Results
In this section, we focus on the main results (detailed results concerning wage and labor
supply estimates can be found in Appendix A, as noted above). We rst check the internal
validity of the behavioral model. Then we compare out-of-sample predictions of a reform
with the actual e¤ects of this reform, suggesting an informal check of the models external
validity. Finally, we propose a series of policy relevant simulations.
5.1 Estimation Results and Internal Validity
There are two benchmarks against which we can assess the internal validity of the behav-
ioral model: the prediction of actual employment rates at every age and the prediction of
the RMI employment e¤ect at the discontinuity.
Employment Rates. Figure 2 reports actual employment levels at all ages as well as
predicted employment rates and their condence intervals obtained with our structural
model (as specied in equation (4) and using a cubic function of age for ()). We distin-
guish results for the whole selected sample and for HS dropouts, respectively. The model
shows a good t, with actual employment rates contained in the predicted condence
intervals at almost all ages, even further away from the cuto¤. Figure 2 also shows a
very small drop in actual employment rates at age 25 for all education groups but a more
signicant drop, around 3:4 percentage points, for HS dropouts. Hence, for the group
combining both low wage prospects and little labor market attachment, there is a notice-
able disincentive e¤ect of the RMI.12 We now turn to a precise assessment of the RMI
employment e¤ect.
RMI Employment E¤ect. As a rst visual check, we see in Figure 2 that, although
employment rates are slightly underpredicted at both 24 and 25 years old, the predicted
drop in employment levels looks very similar to the actual one. The more formal check
consists of comparing the RMI employment e¤ects measured by RD with those predicted
12Similar responses are found to the age discontinuity in social assistance in Canada (Lemieux and
Milligan, 2008) and Denmark (Jonassen, 2013).
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by the structural model. We focus on the specication with a cubic form of () for both
the RD model (1) and the strutural model (4). The di¤erence in actual employment rates
at 24 and 25 years of age, Y 25 Y 24, is  0:7 percentage points (ppt) in the broader group
compared to  3:4 ppt among HS dropouts (not reported). When additionally accounting
for a cubic age trend to extrapolate towards the threshold, we obtain RD treatment e¤ects
i of  1:6 ppt and  3:9 ppt for the broader group and for HS dropouts respectively, as
indicated in the rst column of Table 1. Both e¤ects are statistically signicant. Hence, we
conrm the substantial negative e¤ect of the RMI on singles in the case of HS dropouts.13
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Predicted empl. 95% CI
HS Dropouts
Note: Actual employment rate from 1999 French Census compared to predicted employment rate using
structural model A (sample of 20-30 year old men and women who are available for work).
The next columns of Table 1 compare these estimates with the prediction of the structural
model. The treatment e¤ect in this case accounts for the drop in employment plus the
trends on both sides of the cuto¤ in absence of policy e¤ect, as dened in Appendix C. We
suggest several specications of the structural model. In model A, as described above, age
13The RD graphical analysis as well as sensitivity checks of the RD estimates are provided in Appendices
B.1 and B.2. Estimations of model (1) for di¤erent specications of the RDmodel (age in years or quarters,
() as quadratic, cubic or quartic) indicate a magnitude of i in a range between  5:8 and  3:6 ppt for
HS dropouts.
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Table 1: Employment E¤ects of the RMI: RD vs. Structural Model
All education groups
All -1.6 *** -1.5 *** -1.6 *** -1.6 *** -1.5 *** -1.5 *** -1.1 * -1.9 ***
(0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7)
Male -0.7 -1.7 *** -1.8 *** -1.8 *** -1.6 *** -1.5 *** -1.7 ** -2.0 ***
(0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (0.8)
Female -2.5 *** -1.3 ** -1.4 ** -1.4 ** -1.5 ** -1.5 ** -0.4 -1.8 **
(0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.8)
HS Dropouts
All -3.9 *** -3.9 ** -3.6 *** -3.6 ** -3.9 ** -3.9 ** -3.5 ** -4.1 *
(1.4) (1.5) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) (2.1)
Male -4.2 ** -4.5 *** -4.2 ** -4.2 *** -4.5 *** -4.5 *** -4.1 ** -4.9 **
(1.8) (1.6) (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (1.7) (2.2)
Female -3.4 -2.9 -2.5 -2.5 -3.0 -3.0 -2.5 -2.8
(2.4) (1.9) (2.3) (1.9) (2.0) (2.0) (1.8) (2.5)
B C RD Model A
The employment effect of the RMI is estimated using the RD design or predicted using behavioral models (versions A-C). Both approaches rely here on a cubic age specification
for the additive term. Model (A) omits age in the marginal utility of income while the latter vary linearly and quadratically with age in models (B) and (C) respectively. Models
(A2) and (A3) are similar to model (A) but use age in quarters and months respectively rather than age in years. All figures are based on the 1999 Census data (for
behavioral model, wages are imputed using estimations on the French Labor Force Survey). Out-of-sample predictions are performed on 50% of the sample using the other







is excluded from the marginal utility of consumption (age a¤ects preferences continuously
only through function () in the additive term ai, as in the RD design). Other variants
of this specication, models A2 and A3, use information on age in quarters and months
respectively, rather than age in years.14 In models B and C, the individuals valuation
of the monetary gains from work varies linearly and quadratically with age, respectively.
The RMI employment e¤ects predicted with these di¤erent behavioral models are well in
line with the RD results, i.e. around  1:5 to  1:6 and  3:6 to  3:9 ppt for the whole
selected sample and for HS dropouts respectively. We observe slightly more homogenous
results across gender groups for the whole sample compared to RD estimates. For HS
dropouts, however, the model predicts the larger e¤ects for men well.15
14The forcing variable (age) can be treated more as a continuous variable in this case, so that extrapo-
lations around the discontinuity are less dependent on the parametric form used (see sensitivity analyses
of the RD estimates in Bargain and Doorley, 2011, and the discussion Lee and Card, 2008). It also
generates more noise given smaller age cells. This is not a problem for the t of the structural model and
we notice very little variation when using models A2 and A3.
15Alternative specications for () (quadratic, quartic) do not a¤ect our conclusions qualitatively, even
if small quantitative di¤erences are observed. For HS dropouts, this can be seen in Table 2 in the next
sub-section. Compared to results with the cubic form, we observe larger e¤ects for men, and slightly
larger (smaller) e¤ects with the quadratic (quartic) form for women. Importantly, comparing columns
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Finally, we check that the structural model does not overt the data, which would limit
its external validity. We estimate the model on a random half of the selected sample
(estimation sample), and use estimates to predict employment rates and treatment e¤ects
on the other half (holdout sample). Results are reported in the last two columns of Table
1. The treatment e¤ect on the holdout sample, measured by RD, is very similar to what
was found for the full sample ( 1:1 and  3:5 for the whole selection and for HS dropouts
respectively). The participation model seems to perform relatively well, even if treatment
e¤ects are larger than the RD estimates ( 1:9 and  4:1 respectively). In line with the
RD results, the model points to larger responses by single men compared to single women,
especially among HS dropouts.
Overall the internal validity of the behavioral model is very satisfying, which was expected
since this model is identied using the same discontinuity as the RD model. That is, the
reduced-form estimate of the discontinuity e¤ect is simply transposed to a more structural
setting, i.e. a change in the level of nancial gains to work, so the model shoud replicate
well the discontinuous e¤ect.
5.2 External Validity: Predicting the E¤ect of the 2009 Reform
We now address the external validity of the behavioral model. Extrapolations using this
model rest on the capacity of the discontinuity to capture the essential aspects of work
preferences and on the assumption that these preferences do not change radically over
time. External validity checks consist of comparing model predictions of policy reforms
with what e¤ectively happened after these reforms. More precisely, we simulate the
2009 RSA reform, which essentially reduced the withdrawal rate t from 100% to 38%,
introducing a generous in-work-benet component targeted at the working poor. This
fundamental reform of the French redistributive system was broadly inspired by similar
policies such as the EITC in the US and the WFTC in the UK (see Immervoll et al.,
2007).
Our behavioral model is used to predict the impact of the RSA reform on employment,
using 1999 Census data. Figure 3 shows a small positive e¤ect on the over-25 employment
rates for the whole selection. For HS dropouts, it has a larger positive e¤ect on employ-
ment rates above 25 years old, of about 3 ppt. Unreported additional results show that
due to an increase in wage rates with age, the disincentive e¤ect of the RMI decreases
with age and so does the re-incentivizing e¤ect of the RSA. The change is insignicant
at age 30. There is no e¤ect for those under-25 because the age condition is maintained
under the new scheme.
(1) and (2) conrms that RD estimates and model predictions are very similar in all specications.
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Note: Predicted employment rates from 1999 French Census data using structural model A, for baseline
and introduction of RSA (sample of 20-30 year old men and women who are available for work).
Focusing on HS dropouts, we report the employment e¤ects of the RMI and of the RSA in
the left panel of Table 2, using predictions frommodels A, B and C. Compared to the RMI,
the RSA employment e¤ect at age 25 is much smaller and not signicantly di¤erent from
zero in most cases, conrming the re-incentivizing e¤ect of the in-work component. The
di¤erence between the RMI and the RSA e¤ects points to a correction of the inactivity
trap of around 3 ppt thanks to the RSA reform, with slightly larger e¤ects for women
(between 3:6 and 4:1 over all specications) than for men (between 2:6 and 3).
These results can be compared to the actual e¤ects of the reform. In the last three columns
of Table 2, we report RD estimates of the RMI e¤ect before the reform took place (i.e.
using Census data for years 2004-2008) and just after (years 2010-2011). Results turn out
to be very similar to our model prediction. First, despite time changes in labor market
conditions between 1999 and 2004-2008, we observe a similar disincentive e¤ect of the RMI
before the 2009 reform. It is slightly smaller than in 1999, i.e. between  3:6 and  2:6
over all age specications of the model in column (4). Second, the two years under the
RSA system show no disincentive e¤ect at the cuto¤ (column (5)). Finally, the di¤erential
e¤ect between the two welfare regimes, (5)-(4), is positive and very close to our model
simulations, i.e. between 2:8 and 3:4 over all age specications. RD estimates also conrm
a slightly larger re-incentivization of the RSA for women compared to men, as predicted
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(1) (2) (3) (3) - (2) (2) (3) (3) - (2) (2) (3) (3) - (2) (4) (5) (5) - (4)
Age specification: quadratic
All -5.8 -5.4 -2.4 3.0 -5.4 -2.4 3.0 -5.5 -2.4 3.1 -3.6 -0.8 2.8
(1.1) (1.4) (1.4) (2.0) (1.4) (1.4) (2.0) (1.4) (1.4) (2.0) (1.0) (1.5) (1.4)
Men -5.8 -6.0 -3.4 2.6 -6.0 -3.3 2.6 -6.0 -3.3 2.7 -3.1 -0.6 2.6
(1.9) (1.5) (1.5) (2.2) (1.6) (1.5) (2.2) (1.6) (1.5) (2.2) (1.3) (2.2) (2.0)
Women -4.2 -4.5 -0.8 3.7 -4.6 -0.9 3.7 -4.6 -0.8 3.7 -5.0 -1.2 3.8
(1.8) (1.9) (1.9) (2.7) (1.9) (1.9) (2.7) (1.9) (1.9) (2.7) (1.5) (4.9) (4.2)
Age specification: Cubic
All -3.9 -3.9 -0.9 3.0 -3.9 -0.9 3.0 -3.9 -0.9 3.1 -2.6 0.8 3.4
(1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (2.2) (1.5) (1.5) (2.2) (1.5) (1.5) (2.2) (1.6) (2.3) (2.1)
Men -4.2 -4.5 -1.9 2.6 -4.5 -1.8 2.6 -4.5 -1.8 2.7 -2.2 0.8 3.0
(1.8) (1.6) (1.6) (2.3) (1.6) (1.6) (2.3) (1.6) (1.6) (2.3) (1.9) (3.1) (2.8)
Women -3.4 -2.9 0.7 3.6 -3.0 0.7 3.7 -3.0 0.8 3.7 -3.5 1.3 4.8
(2.4) (1.9) (2.0) (2.8) (2.0) (2.0) (2.8) (2.0) (2.0) (2.8) (1.9) (6.1) (5.2)
Age specification: Quartic
All -4.5 -4.6 -1.3 3.3 -4.6 -1.2 3.4 -4.6 -1.2 3.5 -2.9 0.2 3.0
(1.6) (1.4) (1.8) (2.3) (1.4) (1.8) (2.3) (1.4) (1.8) (2.3) (1.5) (1.4) (2.1)
Men -6.2 -5.2 -2.3 2.9 -5.2 -2.2 3.0 -5.2 -2.1 3.0 -2.6 0.2 2.8
(2.0) (1.5) (1.9) (2.4) (1.6) (1.9) (2.4) (1.6) (1.9) (2.4) (1.9) (2.4) (2.3)
Women -2.2 -3.7 0.3 4.0 -3.8 0.3 4.1 -3.8 0.4 4.1 -3.7 0.2 4.0
(2.6) (1.9) (2.2) (2.9) (1.9) (2.2) (2.9) (1.9) (2.2) (2.9) (1.9) (5.6) (4.8)
The employment effects of the RMI in 1999, the RMI in 2004-08 and the RSA in 2010-11 are estimated using the RD design on Census data from these different periods. Behavioral models
(versions A-C) are estimated on Census 1999 and used to predict employment effects of both RMI and RSA. RD and structural models include an additive and continuous function of age (quadratic,
cubic or quartic specification). In addition, models (B) and (C) include a linear and quadratic form of age, respectively, in the marginal utility of income. Selection: childless single individuals aged 20-30,
HS dropouts. Differential effects ("Diff.") reflect the re-employment impact of the RSA compared to the RMI (the former incorporates an in-work benefit). Models predict this differential effect on the
basis of estimates on Census 1999 while RD 2004-11 show the actual differential effect around the year (2009) when the RSA was actually implemented in replacement of the RMI. Standard errors
in brackets.
Model A (1999) Model B (1999) Model C (1999) RD (2004-11)
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by the behavioral model. The e¤ect is, unfortunately, not statistically signicant in most
specications because of the smaller sample used for the RSA regime, which results in
a lack of power. Nevertheless, such similarity in the results, and in di¤erential results
between men/women or across specications, are very reassuring regarding the external
validity of the model.
5.3 Counterfactual Policy Simulations
Finally, the behavioral model is used to predict important counterfactual policy scenarios.
Results provided in this section use the cubic specication of age (results with other
specications of (), available from the authors, are very similar).
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95% CI base 95% CI abolish RMI
HS Dropouts
Note: Predicted employment rates from 1999 French Census data using structural model A, for baseline
and abolishing the RMI (sample of 20-30 year old men and women available for work).
Abolishing the RMI. Our rst simulation examines the e¤ect of abolishing the RMI.
As expected, Figure 4 shows that removing the RMI would increase participation just
over the 25-year-old threshold. This scenario is certainly not a political option but an
interesting benchmark for comparison. In particular, comparing with Figure 3, we see
that the RSA reform simulated earlier has almost the same relative e¤ect on employment
as that of removing the RMI, i.e. it brings the employment level of HS dropouts aged
25-30 to around 65   67%. Although more costly, the RSA scheme is certainly more
22
politically acceptable, generates important redistribution towards the poor and was the
path actually taken by the French government in 2009.
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Note: Predicted employment rates from 1999 French Census data using structural model A, for baseline
and removing the RMI age condition (sample of 20-30 year old men and women available for work).
Extending the RMI to the Youth. Youth unemployment is a severe issue in France
like in several EU countries. It has received renewed attention recently as it has become
more accentuated in a recessionary context. As the young are more at risk of unemploy-
ment and less likely to have made enough contributions to claim unemployment benet,
the RMI can be an important source of income for them. Currently, their limited access
to welfare programs results in very large poverty rates, as discussed in the introduction.
This raises the question of extending the RMI to those under 25 years of age. Of course,
this strategy runs the risk of increasing welfare dependency by fostering it at a younger
age and of further increasing unemployment among young workers if inactivity traps ex-
ist. Figure 5 simulates the 1999 RMI scenario, abolishing the age condition. While this
hypothetical reform has little e¤ect on the whole sample, the HS dropouts show a negative
employment response, similar to the one observed at the cuto¤. Introducing the RMI for
those under 25 induces a drop in participation of 5 ppt in this group. Symmetrically to the
e¤ect of abolishing the RMI, this shows that young workers with low wage prospects may
be tempted to claim the RMI and live on welfare, which casts doubts on the desirability
23
of extending unconditional welfare payments to this group.
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Note: Predicted employment rates from 1999 French Census using structural model A, for RSA scenario
and removing the RSA age condition (sample of 20-30 year old men and women available for work).
Extending the RSA to the Youth. This calls for a last simulation: What would be
the e¤ect of extending the RSA scheme to the under-25 year-olds? This is a highly topical
and relevant question in the current policy debate in France (see Bargain and Vicard,
2014).16 We start with a baseline simulation of the RSA policy scenario and simulate a
removal of the age condition. Extending the RSA to the young combines two opposite
forces. On the one hand, we have seen that extending out-of-work welfare programs to
the young creates disincentive e¤ects for the under-25s, especially for the HS dropouts.
On the other hand, the young can also benet from in-work incentives with the RSA. The
overall e¤ect is undetermined. The results, in Figure 6, show that extending the RSA to
the young would not have a signicant employment e¤ect for the whole selected group.
We observe a small decrease in employment rates for the more vulnerable HS dropouts,
yet it is not signicant. Hence, our simulation gives support to the extension of welfare
programs in France provided that in-work components are in place to "make work pay".
16An extension to 18-25 year olds was actually implemented in September 2011, although with very
strict eligibility rules. A very small number of young workers have actually taken up this "junior RSA"
so this should not a¤ect our results on Census 2010-2011 in the previous sub-section.
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6 Conclusions
We have studied the labor supply e¤ect of the pre-2009 French social assistance program
(RMI) around age 25, i.e. the age limit under which young workers are not eligible. This
discontinuity provides a neat identication of the employment e¤ect around the cuto¤,
which is estimated by RD on 1999 Census data. However, RD estimates do not allow
predicting the e¤ect of all types of counterfactual policy, notably the e¤ect of decreasing
the taper rate of the benet, as implemented in the 2009 RSA reform. By doing so, this
reform has introduced a generous in-work transfer component to the French redistributive
system, and its re-incentivization e¤ect needs to be assessed. To do so, we estimate
a structural model identied on the same age discontinuity as in the RD design, i.e.
nancial gains to work change at age 25 due to the policy age condition.
Estimations of labor supply models on cross-sectional data rely on demographic hetero-
geneity combined with multiple nonlinearities or discontinuities in tax-benet rules. These
multiple sources of identication are rarely made explicit and are not necessarily robust
(for instance, tax allowances for a third child cannot easily be used as exogeneous varia-
tion since having a third child also relates to specic preferences regarding fertility and
labor supply). In constrat, we focus on a homogeneous group of single childless individuals
around age 25 (the RMI age condition applies only to childless households). This provides
us with a very clean setting since we can abstract from much of the demographic variation
that can a¤ect preferences and focus on the role of the age discontinuity in the identica-
tion of the model. Moreover, age is a source of variation upon which individuals have no
control upon and which allows plausible exclusion restrictions (i.e. that preferences vary
continuously with age).
As expected, our behavioral model ts the data well (it reproduces the participation
drop at age 25 and predicts employment levels at other age levels satisfactorily). More
impressively, the model shows good external validity. We check this by simulating the
2009 RSA reform and comparing its predicted employment e¤ect with the actual e¤ect
assessed using data around the year 2009 (i.e., obtained as the di¤erenced RD estimates
before and after the actual reform). The predictions of our model closely mirror the
actual e¤ects of the reform under various model specications. This informal check,
despite being only suggestive evidence, is an important nding. Indeed, while labor supply
models are widely used for policy simulation, their external validity is rarely tested in the
literature. Moreover, going more structural helps answering questions a more reduced-
form approach like the RD design could not answer, especially when we gain condence
in the models out-of-sample predictions. Thus the model is used to simulate important
reforms and shows that (i) extending redistribution toward the working poor thanks to
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the RSA restores nancial incentives to work among high school dropouts, (ii) this new
redistributive policy could be extended to the under-25 year olds without creating new
disincentive e¤ects in this population.
We suggest a list of possible improvements. First, we have focused on a structural par-
ticipation model. The extensive margin is, arguably, the primary dimension that merits
investigation in the context of youth unemployment. This is surely the margin with the
greatest degree of potential response in the short run, simply because people can always
opt out of the labor market (in contrast, nding a di¤erent hour contract may be di¢ cult
and subject to constraints, cf. Chetty et al, 2011). In this respect it is, therefore, the
best ground for reconciling structural models and natural experiments as we do here. Yet,
the general discrete choice labor supply model presented in section 4.2 could be identied
and estimated if additional sources of exogenous variation were found, e.g., other discon-
tinuities a¤ecting the nancial gains to work part-time versus full-time. Second, external
validity was checked using a change in the disincentive e¤ect at 25 following changes in
policy parameters. Ideally, we would also like to check the performance of the model at
other age points further away from the discontinuity. This could be done, for instance,
if the government changed the age condition from 25 to 22. Third, Census panel data
(as available in Denmark, cf. Jonassen, 2013) could be used to check how far from the
discontinuity we obtain good predictive power solely on the basis of the 25 year-old dis-
continuity. Using consecutive years of panel data could also be used to check employment
rates for groups "crossing" the cuto¤ and to control for cohort e¤ects.
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A Wage Estimation, Simulated Income and Labor
Supply Estimation
A.1 Wage Estimations
A central component of nancial gains to work in equation (4) is the wage rate. When
estimating structural models, it is standard to proceed in two stages, rst with the esti-
mation of a wage equation and wage prediction for non-workers, then with the estimation
of the labor supply model. We specify the wage equation as:
logwi = (Ai) + :EDUCi + :Zi + i + i (5)
assuming a normally distributed residual i and including the following explanatory vari-
ables: a smooth function of age (Ai), the set of detailed education categories EDUCi
and additional controls Zi (gender). The traditional labor supply literature has pointed
to two issues relating to wage endogeneity. First, hourly wages may be partly deter-
mined by omitted unobservable variables (being hard working) which are associated with
preferences, as discussed in section 2.1. We follow the standard Heckman approach and
introduce an inverse Mills ratio i, estimated on the basis of a reduced form employment
probability. The latter includes the age function (Ai), controls Zi and disposable income
at zero hours C(0;Ai) as an instrument, relying again on the discontinuity at age 25 for
identication. Second, calculated as earnings divided by worked hours, hourly wages may
be contaminated by the same measurement error as those contained in worked hours.
To avoid this so-called division bias, we predict wages for all observations, workers and
non-workers, as suggested by Eklof and Sacklén (2000). Predicting for all makes it less
of a concern to use one dataset for estimation (FLFS) and another for predictions (Cen-
sus), as long as (i) the second data source provides accurate information on wages, (ii)
both datasets contain the same variables, with identical denitions. As argued above
and in Chemin and Wasmer (2012), the FLFS is a robust dataset that contains detailed
information on earnings and that can be used for reliable wage estimation. Moreover,
all variables, and in particular the education categories in vector EDUCi, are available
in both datasets according the exact same denition. Thus we use estimates of equation
(5) to predict wages for all individuals in the Census, drawing wage residuals i in a
normal distribution with zero mean and using their estimated empirical variance. Since,
in principle, workers cannot receive wages below the minimum wage, we discard i draws
leading to wages below this wage oor for employed individuals in the Census.
Log hourly wage estimations using the FLFS data are reported in Table A.1 together
with the reduced-form participation equation for the Heckman correction. A signicant
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gender gap can be observed, in line with the existence of a "sticky oor" e¤ect in France
(Arulampalam et al, 2007) as well as a regular wage progression with the level of education.
The Inverse Mills ratio is not signicant. In the participation equation, disposable income
when out of work is negative, as expected. It is not statistically signicant, probably due
to the lack of power in the FLFS (Chemin and Wasmer, 2012, reproduce our RD results
using 12 years of FLFS while we use here only the 3 years surrounding 1999).
We check the robustness of our wage imputation in Figures B.1 (men) and B.2 (women).
The upper graphs show that actual and predicted log wage distributions for workers in
the FLFS are relatively comparable, with the exception of the few observations below
the minimum wage, a situation that we rule out in our predictions. The bottom-left
graph of each Figure shows that the distribution of predicted (log) wages for workers in
the Census is very comparable to the one obtained in the FLFS (top right graph). This
conrms that distributions of socio-demographics in both surveys are similar enough (see
Table A.2 below) and allow comparable predictions of the wage distribution. The last
graph shows the distributions of predicted (log) wages for the whole Census selection
(workers and non-workers), as used in the labor supply estimations. Moving from wages
to disposable incomes, we show in the next sub-section that predicted disposable incomes,
calculated using tax-benet simulations and gross incomes (actual ones in the FLFS or
work durationimputed wages in the Census), line up quite closely in the two datasets.
Table A.1: Wage Estimation with Selection on LFS Data
Variables
Age -0.048 (0.023) 0.079 (0.099)
Age square / 100 0.001 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002)
Female -0.112 (0.007) 0.042 (0.027)
Junior vocational qualification 0.054 (0.011)
Highschool diploma 0.168 (0.016)
Vocational highschool dipl. 0.131 (0.013)
Graduate qualification 0.352 (0.011)
Disposable income 0 hours/100 -0.006 (0.017)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.003 (0.101)
Constant 4.177 (0.301) -0.338 (1.263)
Observations 7,101 9,986
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Figure B.2: Comparing Actual and Predicted Log Wage Distributions in FLFS and
Census Data (Women)
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics and Simulation of Disposable Incomes
Table A.2 reports descriptive statistics for the Census data and the FLFS (we present two
alternative FLFS sample selections: a pool of years 1997-2001 to increase sample size and
the 1999 wave). Results show that the distribution of demographic characteristics are
very similar in the two datasets. We also report the mean levels of simulated disposable
incomes, calculated for each individual in the data as a function C(E;A) of gross income E
(it is also conditional on age A given RMI rules). Capital income is ignored as very small
amounts are reported in this age group, especially for the low-educated youths that we
focus on. Hence, gross income E corresponds essentially to earnings, i.e. actual earnings
as observed in the FLFS or predicted earnings for all observations in the Census (actual
work durationpredicted wages). Function C(E;A) accounts for social contributions and
taxes paid on labor income E as well as benets received, which we approximate by very
detailed numerical simulation of the French tax-benet rules. For our selection of childless
single individuals, simulated transfers essentially consist of the RMI (a function of age A)
and housing benets. Table A.2 shows that the levels of disposable income are consistent
across the two data sources. As explained in the text, tax-benet simulations are also used
to calculate, for each individual, disposable incomes in and out of work, for the purpose
of estimating the structural participation model. That is, disposable income C(wH;A) is
simulated at di¤erent worked hours H (zero and full-time) using imputed wages.
A.3 Labor Supply Estimations
Table A.3 shows the estimates of the RD model and of the participation model. Looking
at the constant in the coe¢ cients on in-work and out-of-work income in the participation
model, the marginal e¤ect of 1 additional EUR on participation is very di¤erent whether
we consider in-work or out-of-work income. The e¤ect of income at zero hours is roughly
six times smaller uneducated (HS dropout) females with model A, which could reect
(i) the fact that nancial incentives depend primarily on income prospects on the labor
market, (ii) the negative e¤ects attached to welfare payments (e.g., stigma), (iii) other
reasons including the lack of variability in C(0; Ai) for the identication of a di¤erentiated
e¤ect.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics for single childless 20-30 year olds in the Census and LFS





Proportion of men 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.60 0.60
Age 26 26 27 23 23 23 27.5 27 27
Education:
Junior vocational qualification 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.24
Highschool 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06
Vocational highschool 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.11
Graduate qualification 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.32 0.29 0.43 0.39 0.41
Dropouts 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.17
Work hours 30 32 26 29 31 31 31 33 32
Employment rate 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.81
Employment income* 1,534 1,440 1,429 1,392 1,267 1,228 1,583 1,510 1,510
Disposable income* 1,032 1,132 1,136 893 983 926 1,081 1,190 1,217
Sample size 202,093 9,986 2,040 53,048 2,833 570 149,045 7,153 1,470
* All monetary variables are expressed in 1999 EUR/month.
Note: selection of childless single individuals between 20-30 years old. Data sources are the 1999 French Census, the pooled 1997-2001 French Labor Force Survey (FLFS) and the 1999
FLFS. Disposable income is calculated using labor income and the EUROMOD tax-benefit simulator on the data. In Census data, we predict wages using estimations conducted on LFS
data. All monetary variables are expressed in 1999 EUR/month. Employment income excludes zeros. Disposable income is found to be positive for all observations.
Under 25 Over 25All
B RD Analysis of the RMI Employment E¤ect
B.1 RD Estimates
We suggest here a detailed RD analysis. We start with a graphical investigation of the
1999 RMI employment e¤ect. In Figure B.1, we plot actual employment rates by age
along with the 95% condence intervals using our selected sample from the 1999 Census.
Note that these intervals, which indicate sampling errors, are di¤erent from the condence
intervals in Figure 2, which reect prediction errors of model (4). As indicated in the main
text, this graphical representation suggests a very small drop in employment at age 25
for the full sample but a larger drop for HS dropouts.
Turning to the RD model (1), in Table 2 we nd estimates of i in a range between 3:9
and 5:8 percentage points for HS dropouts over all specications of the model (age in years
or quarters, () as quadratic, cubic, quartic or quadratic spline). They are statistically
signicantly di¤erent from zero in all cases. The e¤ect expressed in percentage points
can be divided by the employment rate at age 24 for the HS dropout (67:7%) to give the
proportion of people concerned by the disincentive e¤ect at the discontinuity, i.e., between
5:3  8:6% in this group. This order of magnitude is similar to estimates in Bargain and
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Table A.3: Estimates: RD and Participation Models on Census Data
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
Preference for work
Age 0.716 0.221 2.742 1.219 2.791 1.220 2.649 1.240 0.751 0.293 0.250 0.098
Age2 -0.026 0.009 -0.099 0.049 -0.100 0.049 -0.100 0.049 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.000
Age3 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Male 0.068 0.008 0.748 0.145 0.732 0.146 0.734 0.146 0.751 0.145 0.751 0.145
Age*educated -0.361 0.244 -1.112 1.422 -1.147 1.424 -0.968 1.442 -0.429 0.344 -0.143 0.115
Age2*educated 0.014 0.010 0.047 0.057 0.050 0.057 0.051 0.058 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000
Age3*educated 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Male*educated -0.040 0.009 -0.164 0.160 -0.238 0.160 -0.242 0.160 -0.167 0.160 -0.167 0.160
Educated 3.188 1.994 10.108 11.649 9.081 11.679 5.807 12.256 15.100 11.488 15.100 11.488
Constant -5.816 1.805 -26.524 9.967 -27.255 9.997 -25.043 10.594 -29.103 9.789 -29.103 9.789





Coefficients on Income when H=0 (divided by 100)
Male 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.016 0.024 0.016 0.026 0.016 0.026 0.016
Male*educated -0.020 0.019 -0.026 0.019 -0.027 0.019 -0.020 0.019 -0.020 0.019
Educated -0.014 0.025 -0.011 0.025 -0.011 0.025 -0.004 0.024 -0.004 0.024
Constant 0.038 0.022 0.039 0.022 0.039 0.022 0.033 0.021 0.033 0.021
Coefficients on Income when H=39 hours/week (divided by 100)
Male -0.052 0.013 -0.051 0.013 -0.051 0.013 -0.052 0.013 -0.052 0.013
Age -0.002 0.002 0.021 0.037
Age2 0.000 0.001
Male*educated 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.014
Age*educated -0.009 0.002 -0.048 0.041
Age2*educated 0.001 0.001
Educated -0.067 0.012 0.166 0.063 0.661 0.528 -0.067 0.012 -0.067 0.012








RD estimates are obtained by OLS. The participation model is estimated by simulated ML with conditional probabilities averaged over ten wage x unobserved heterogeneity draws. Model (A) omits age
in the marginal utility of income while the latter vary linearly and quadratically with age in models (B) and (C) respectively. Models (A2) and (A3) are similar to model (A) but use age in quarters and
















Doorley (2011) who focus on men only.
An important aspect is whether results are sensitive to the distance of observations from
the discontinuity. The parametric estimation provides global estimates of the regression
function over all values of the forcing variable, while the RD design depends instead on
local estimates of the regression function at the cuto¤ point. Thus we have also checked
whether the treatment e¤ect varies in a linear spline model for an increasingly small
window around age 25. We nd very stable estimates, which are additionally conrmed
by non-parametric estimations with varying bandwidths (not reported).
Finally, we compare these results to the changes in employment at age 25 for a number of
placebo control groups, not a¤ected by the discontinuity. The rst group is uneducated
workers with children, i.e. not a¤ected by the age condition. We nd no signicant
employment change at 25 for this group. A second set of comparison groups consists of
uneducated workers in 1982 (before the introduction of the RMI) and in 1990 (only one
year after its introduction, i.e., a time when the program was not yet well publicized and
concerned a much smaller population). As shown in Figure B.2, there is no sign of a
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Figure B.2: Employment Rates of Childless Singles between 1982 and 1999 (Census)
B.2 Dynamics
The RD design in the case of an age-based discontinuity is a special case of the standard
RD design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Assignment to treatment, i.e. eligibility for the
RMI, is inevitable, as all subjects will eventually age into the program. Two issues arise
in this case. Firstly, the discontinuity should be interpreted as the combined e¤ect of all
factors that switch on at the threshold. An extensive examination of any other potential
inuences on employment at age 25 is undertaken by Bargain and Doorley (2011) and
summarized in section 3.1, conrming that there is no other factor at work at this age
threshold, except the RMI. Secondly, because treatment is inevitable with the passage
of time, individuals may fully anticipate the change in regime and adjust their labor
market behavior before the threshold. In this case, optimizing behavior, in anticipation
of eventual eligibility for the RMI, would accentuate observed e¤ects.
We believe that this is implausible for a number of reasons (see further discussion in
Bargain and Doorley, 2011). First, it seems unlikely that the group which displays the
largest response to the RMI, HS dropouts, would be fully aware of the benet rules and,
thus, work more until they turn 25 in order to be able to drop out of the labor market at
age 25. Second, for a 20-25 year old, eligibility for the RMI will certainly happen at age
25 but may also happen if the individual has a child in the meantime or cohabits with
somebody who is eligible. We, however, observe no accelerated fertility or cohabitation
rates before age 25, indicating limited anticipation e¤ects in this respect. Third, we do nd
evidence that the share of HS dropouts on short-term contracts decreases discontinuously
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after age 25, indicating that, rather than working more or harder, highschool dropouts are
lingering in precarious activities until they become eligible for the RMI, at which point
the cost of nding another short-term contract may seem large when a minimum income
is guaranteed anyway. Fourth, a graphical inspection of the employment trends of 20-25
year olds in 1982 (before the introduction of the RMI), in 1990 and in 1999 shows little
evidence of a time change in employment trends before the discontinuity (see Figure B.2).
Finally, after 25 years old, we notice a similarly at employment pattern in both periods
(1999 versus early years), which shows that the RMI disincentive e¤ect is responsible
for a change in employment levels at 25 but not for the shape of the employment curve
after 25. As discussed in Bargain and Doorley (2011) and Lemieux and Milligan (2008),
the attening over 25-30 is due to a negative selection of childless single individuals
on the labor market. These conclusions are reinforced by similar ndings in Denmark.
Using Census panel data, Jonassen (2012) conrms that the employment drop at the age
cuto¤ corresponds to transitions out of work, which occur within 6 months after the 25th
birthday.
C Measuring Treatment E¤ect with the Behavioral
Model
We explain here how the structural model can be used to assess the RMI employment
e¤ect at the discontinuity. The di¤erential in employment levels between 24 and 25 is
not exactly equal to the treatment e¤ect. Indeed we need to account for employment
trends on both sides of the cuto¤. Ignoring individual heterogeneity and assuming we use
a linear probability model to ease notation, we can write the treatment e¤ect in the RD
design as:
 = Y 25   Y 24 + :[(25)  (24)] (6)
with Y A the average participation level at age A. By analogy, we can dene the treatment
e¤ect in the structural model as:
Y 25   Y 24 + a1:[(25)  (24)]: (7)
When assuming b1 = b0 = b > 0, this also corresponds to
b f[C( ewiH; 25)  C(0; 25)]  [C( ewiH; 24)  C(0; 24)]g ;
i.e. a change in the nancial gains to work between 25 and 24 years of age. This denition
fails to account for the di¤erentiated e¤ect of age on wages at age 24 and 25, however.
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Therefore, the correct measure of the policy e¤ect at the cuto¤ requires the evaluation of
the employment gap at age 25, accounting for the no-RMI counterfactual situation C0:
[fb1C( ewi(25)H; 25)  b0C(0; 25)g   fb1C0( ewi(25)H; 25)  b0C0(0; 25)g]:
The policy e¤ect at the cuto¤ is therefore:
Y 25   Y 24 + a1:[(25)  (24)] (8)
 b1fC0( ewiH; 25)  C( ewiH; 24)g
in the basic model where b parameters do not vary with age (model A) and recognizing
that C(0; 25)   C0(0; 24) = 0 by denition. Hence, the only di¤erence with (7) is a
correction for the di¤erence in wage levels between age 25 and 24 in the last term. In the
more general case, the e¤ect is:
Y 25   Y 24 + a1:[(25)  (24)] (9)
+fb0(25)C(0; 25)  b0(24)C0(0; 24)g
 fb1(25)C0( ewiH; 25)  b1(24)C( ewiH; 24)g:
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